Here are some quick thoughts on the offer Theresa May has made to EU citizens who want to remain in the UK after Brexit.
Rights of residency
So I’m not entirely sure how May could meet the Commission’s position in a satisfactory way. The Commission is very unlikely to accept an offer to replace EU expats’ family rights with the equivalent UK rights, so that EU spouses would have to meet an earning threshold. The UK is similarly unlikely to change its own laws to make them equivalent to EU law – it would feel a lot like duress. Could May and Davis, perhaps, offer an extended period within which EU expats could bring family members over under EU law – i.e. a period longer than the five-year residency minimum – and after that the anomaly would end and EU expats would revert to UK family rights?
The other issue regarding family rights is how derived rights will work. Section II of the Commission’s position paper envisages ‘current and future family members’ inheriting the right of residence of EU citizens resident in the UK at the time of Brexit. Hopefully the text of the agreement will state unambiguously that the rights created by the agreement can only be inherited once – so, e.g., an EU citizen who at the point of Brexit had lived in the UK for five years or more would enjoy residency rights, and also be able to pass them on to her child, but that child would not be able to pass the same rights on to his children. The second generation, i.e. the original EU citizen’s grandchildren, would then have the option of becoming UK citizens. If the agreement is unclearly worded regarding the inheritability of residency rights, there arises the unappealing prospect of a long-term two-tier legal system, and (if the agreement is to be enforced by the European Court of Justice) the possibility of UK elected ministers being indefinitely liable to the ECJ, even long after Brexit.
Right of return
If this is indeed what the Commission is proposing, then I hope May and Davis will resist it as a disproportionate and unreasonable proposition.
- The stated political aim of any expats agreement is to prevent disruption to the lives of EU citizens living in the UK, and vice versa. Allowing right of return cannot be a rational means of achieving that aim, because its purpose is not to prevent disruption to lives, but to prevent loss of a life chance (i.e. the opportunity to return some time in the future). Loss of an opportunity is often unfortunate, but it is not the same as disruption or upheaval – nor is it clear that the UK should take on the extent of liability proposed by the EU merely for the sake of allowing EU citizens who once lived in the UK to keep their options open about a possible return.
- It would be unreasonable to ask UK ministers to agree to this proposition when they cannot know the extent of the liability they would be agreeing to – how many EU citizens have lived in the UK, and how many of them might return? The Commission seems to propose that an indeterminate number of people would be entitled to an expensive suite of services, and would possibly be protected by a foreign court with the power to bind UK ministers – it could not be reasonable to assent to such an unclear and uncertain proposal.
- The Commission, as with all proposals in the position paper, proposes a reciprocal arrangement for UK citizens in the EU. However, the relative liabilities are not at all reciprocal – a large and very populous region openly accepting expats from a much smaller and less populous one, is not equivalent to a small region having to freely accept expats from a much a larger and more populous one.
- Even if one accepts, as I do, that loss of the right to return to the UK would be inconvenient for those EU citizens who had left the UK with concrete plans to return, and that this inconvenience should be averted by any withdrawal agreement, the Commission’s proposal of an open-ended right of return is an excessive and disproportionate means of averting this inconvenience, when it could effectively be averted by the much more modest ‘grace period’ already proposed by Theresa May. A grace period of two years following the end of the Article 50 negotiations would give those planning a return just under four years to make their decision – it seems reasonable, though not indisputable, to say that that would be a sufficient period of time to keep the door open.
- Finally, the Commission and the EU as a whole must accept that a key purpose of the Brexit negotiation is for the UK to leave the EU’s sovereignty-pooling system, and to regain the elements of national sovereignty it had previously ceded as an EU member. The right of return proposal does not seem consistent with that purpose – it accepts that the UK after Brexit will no longer be part of the same shared accommodation for EU citizens, but also insists that anyone who has lived here should retain a key to the house. You don’t really get your house back if an indefinite number of former tenants are allowed to keep copies of the front door key.
Again, all of the above section will be irrelevant if the EU is in fact not asking for a right of return for its citizens.
There seem to be grounds for saying the Commission position is over-stated, as one would expect in a negotiation, and not a proposal that could be reasonably agreed to.
unreasonable proposition unfairer oversight then when members, not consistent third-party status, no certainty given interpretation of ECJ. Agreement not reciprocal if ecj adjudicates on rights of UK citizens in EU, as well as of EU citizens in UK.
- There is no reciprocity if the ECJ enforces the rights of EU citizens in the UK, and of UK citizens in the UK.
- Under articles 221 and 224 of the Treaty of Nice, the ECJ must consist of one judge per member state. The Commission proposal is that the UK accept jurisdiction without representation. It is bold to ask the UK to accept continued ECJ jurisdiction when in all other respects it will be a third-party nation with regards the EU; it is outright unreasonable to ask the UK to accept this jurisdiction in a form that is unfair according to the EU’s own criteria. Continued jurisdiction is controversial enough – continued jurisdiction in an unfairer form is unacceptable.
- I note, though I haven’t really researched this yet, that the reason EFTA has its own court, instead of coming under the ECJ, is because the ECJ insisted that anything else would be unlawful: it would have been a violation of the treaties to give EU institutions power of oversight against the non-EU member states of EFTA. So would it be lawful for the ECJ to have jurisdiction over the UK after its withdrawal? I caveat this: first, I have a weak grasp of EU law and there could be any number of reasons why the decision on the EFTA court is irrelevant; second, any withdrawal agreement would presumably be itself an amendment of the treaties, and so would create new provisions allowing the ECJ to have power of oversight over the UK. Fine, it would be strictly lawful, but only at the cost of sacrificing what seems like a valid principle – it seems entirely right that EU institutions should not have jurisdiction over non-EU member states.
- Finally, the continued jurisdiction of the ECJ would cement in law a two-tier system. It also hints at a principle that says that jurisdiction is not geographical, or based on settled seats of government, but that free-floating citizens carry it with them, even to the point of intruding their jurisdiction upon the jurisdiction of nation states. It’s fair to say I have an instinctual feeling that this is a bad idea. Perhaps the EU will argue, as English courts once did, that ECJ jurisdiction ‘follows the flag’ wherever EU citizens go. But to do so would confirm that the modern EU is as expansionist, and as contemptuous of the sovereignty of foreigners, as the British Empire once was. If it were the case that the citizens in question formed a coherent body of people, united by common cause, then I would be more open to accepting that formed an ‘enclave’ of people to be protected by their own jurisdiction. But they are not. That the Commission thinks the disparate interests of disparate individuals are sufficient to outweigh a nation state’s claims to unitary sovereign jurisdiction gives some flavour of how radically (and, in my opinion, how prematurely) it rejects the sovereignty of nation states.
I conclude by pointing out that the Commission’s insistence on continued ECJ jurisdiction might be fairly easily defeated. First, the position of the EU Council, which has greater legal power than the Commission, is notably equivocal on ECJ jurisdiction post-Brexit: it insists on the ECJ ruling on disputes still unresolved at the date of Brexit, but says that post-Brexit there should be merely ‘appropriate dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms’ which ‘bear in mind’ the role of the ECJ. It seems that the Commission perhaps overstated its brief.
Second, the Commission has previously shown imaginativeness in agreeing enforcement mechanisms for trade deals. The Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine provides for an independent arbitral tribunal for the resolution of disputes between the parties (see ch 14 of this 2,135-page monster). It is not idle to hope the EU and UK can agree on a similar middle path – a specially constituted European court including British judges, for instance.